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THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE:
THE SHORTAGE FACTOR
INTRODUCTION
Among the wonders in Mr. Ripley's catalogue of the strange occurrences of nature is a peculiar "tree" which lives even now on a windswept plateau high in the Andes. Unlike most trees, which in their
growing process choke out all other sizable growth within a certain radius of their trunks, this "tree" is actually formed from the side-by-side
growth of two trees: one leaf-bearing, and one fir. The result is what
appears to be a single tree, but one of distinctly different character
depending upon the side which is viewed. While there can be no doubt
as to the separate ancestry of each, the meshed root system, the parallel
trunks and the entwined branches combine to create a vital identity
which is more real than apparent. It is impossible to truly know one
without knowing the other.
Too often, practitioners of the law fail to appreciate the close relationship which the law shares with economic forces. This is true despite
the fact that these forces operate upon the same society as does the law,
and despite the fact that the nature and scope of the law are to a great
extent themselves a function of these economic forces. Too often it is
considered enough to ascertain what the reporter has included under
the appropriate headnote in the statute book, regulation pamphlet or
advance sheet. Arguably, in some areas of legal practice such an attitude is equal to the task at hand due to the pedestrian nature of the
subject matter.
Such is not the case in the area which has come to be known as
international commercial law. Here, the dynamics of world economics
play a key role in the constant evolution and episodic revolution of the
law.
It is the purpose of this comment to focus upon those factors which
have had significant impact upon transnational trade within the past
several months, 1 and which are likely to affect further developments in
the months to come. To that end, this study2 integrates economic 3 factors with those which, in a more orthodox sense, are purely legal.
1. This comment focuses primarily upon the time period October 1973 through late
March 1974, although it frequently touches upon previous events and contemplates future
developments.
2. This comment employs a topical approach. While certain topics bearing upon or
influenced by economic shortages (such as inflation) are not treated directly, they have
been weighed and factored into those topics which are presented.
3. Political factors are also considered where appropriate.
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WORLD ECONOMIC SHORTAGES

Certainly the linchpin of all developments bearing upon transnational trade during the past quarter has been economic shortage. One
such shortage, that of fossil fuel, and specifically crude ·oil, has seemingly eclipsed the others. However, there is a broad range of commodities or "real" goods for which there is currently an international seller's
market. This has resulted from the uncoordinated interaction of a number of factors, only a portion of which are political in nature. This
section deals with shortages in general, and focuses upon oil. It analyzes
the impact of such shortages upon various countries and types of countries, both exporting and importing, the relatively undeveloped as well
as the industrialized. It highlights the resultant changes in trade relations and bargaining positions; considers the various diplomatic initiatives which have been pursued in an effort to stabilize world trade; and
finally, examines the most sophisticated means yet employed in the
classic and ongoing attempt to read the palm of the "invisible hand" at
work in the market place. In this case the forum is the world. Each finger
twitch has a potentially great significance for international commercial
law.
A.
1.

The Shortage of Oil
GENERALLY

The shortage of oil in the United States and most other Western
industrialized countries4 during the period of the Arab embargo5 and
production cutback 6 must be seen in perspective. While the move was
4. Canada occupies a unique position among western industrialized nations. While
it imports oil to service its eastern provinces, it is, on balance, an oil exporting country.
As with all other countries, however, the price of oil rose sharply in Canada. Thus, despite
its seemingly privileged position as an exporter, its industry was still seriously affected
by those higher prices.
5. The embargo extended from October 16, 1973 through March 18, 1974. On the
latter date, seven of the nine Arab countries which had imposed controls upon the sale of
their oil lifted that portion of those controls which forbade export to the United States.
The embargo was left in effect with regard to the Netherlands. The seven nations terminating the ban on March 18 were: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Bahrain,
Egypt and Algeria. The two continuing the ban were Syria and Libya. Syrian oil exports
are of minimal importance. However, Libya had shipped an average of 205,000 barrels per
day to the United States prior to the embargo. N .Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1974, at 20, col. 3.
6. From a global point of view the far more serious component of the Arab actions
was the production cutback . In November 1973 it amounted to 25% of former output, thus
taking five million barrels per day off the world market. In December, the reduction was
relaxed when it was concluded that most Western European countries, the United Kingdom and Japan had sufficiently altered their foreign policy with respect to Israel. At that
point, most African and Asian nations were allotted increased supplies. N.Y. Times, Mar,
19, 1974, at 20, col. 4.
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unprecedented, it was not entirely unforeseeable. Well prior to the embargo, the rising demand for oil and oil derivative products, coupled
with the rapid depletion in traditional sources of supply, resulted in
increased price-setting leverage· for alF oil exporters. Those of the Middle East were certainly no exception. In the two and one half years
immediately preceding the embargo, the Middle-East, oil-producing
countries twice succeeded in efforts to renegotiate extraction royalties. 8
Twice, they imposed what, at the time, were dramatically sharp increases.n Thus, the cessation of the embargo and even the restoration of
production to September 1973 levels 10 only removed a certain degree 11
of intrigue from the petroleum commodity situation. The shortage is real
and will continue.12 Two questions remain: what is its impact, and secondly, what is being done about it?
7. Non-Arab exporters benefitting from the rise in price include five members of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). They are: Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria, Indonesia and Equador. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1974, at 11, col. 1.
8. The Persian Gulf states first demonstrated their collective market power at Teheran in 1971 when they forced the oil companies operating in their countries to agree to
more than double the royalties they would pay during the next four years. In 1972, Saudi
Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Qatar signed agreements under which the government share of
ownership of the extracting firms would rise from 25% to 51 % by 1982. NAT'L J. REP., 1973,
at 1540.
9. Under the Teheran agreement of 1971 the producer countries' per barrel receipts
had increased from $.80 which had been the prevailing rate in 1970, to $1.25 in 1971 and
were scheduled to increase to $1.80 by 1985. Effective increases were still greater as a result
of 1972 agreements reached in Rijadh under which the producer countries began to receive
a percentage of production. NAT'L J. REP., 1973, at 1213-14.
10. By far the world's greatest exporter of crude oil, Saudi Arabia, was producing at
the· rate of 8.3 million barrels per day in September 1973. At the time of the lifting of the
embargo against the United States in March of this year it was estimated that daily
production levels stood at 7.3 million barrels per day. N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1974, at 1,
col. 3.
11. Ultimately the intrigue remains for the embargo could be reimposed either in
whole or in part. Most of the Persian Gulf states are governed by absolute rulers. While
these men are highly educated and concerned with long range plans which are dependent
upon oil receipts, they are sufficiently secure in their positions and desires that a reimposition must not be dismissed as an impossibility.
12. The question of how long the oil shortage will last has been widely debated and
is beyond the scope of this comment. Additionally, as has been demonstrated, political
factors make projections regarding oil supply problematical at best. However, it should
be noted that plans do exist which, if carried out, would make Saudi Arabia the world's
largest producer (surpassing the United States and the Soviet Union which currently rank
first and second respectively). This would quickly end supply shortfall until alternate
sources of energy such as nuclear, solar and geo-thermal were expanded to assume the bulk
of the tasks now performed through the use of oil. Despite the cogent arguments for
continued Arab supply controls it is perhaps significant that Saudi expansion programs
continued throughout the embargo and production cutback. See, Farnsworth, Oil Output
and Prices, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1974, at 21, cols. 3-4.
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IMPACT

a.

Net Oil Importing Countries

The impact of the shortage upon net oil importing countries has
been uniformly negative. However the degree of dislocation has varied
widely, usually increasing with the extent to which a given country's
economy depends upon imported oil. 13 The removal of the embargo did
nothing to alter this fact.
Japan provides an example. 14 Like all industrialized countries 15 it
has built and planned its economy largely upon presumptions of an
abundant supply of inexpensive energy and raw materials. Primary
among those assumptions was that there was, and would continue to be,
abundant supplies of inexpensive petroleum. The assumption went one
important step further, however; it was assumed that those supplies
would not only continue to exist, but that they would continue to be
made available. The distinction is as critical as it is subtle. While the
oil certainly exists, rn in general 17 its owners have simply decided to restrict its flow toward the market. 111
13. A recently published report indicated the following representative levels of dependency upon imported oil as a percentage of total oil demand: United Kingdom, 98%;
France, 95%; United States, 16%; The Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany,
93%. INT'L CURRENCY REv., Jan./Feb . 1974, at 36.
In another report, using perhaps more current data, the "oil saving capacity" of
several key international traders was computed. This index took into account two factors:
the share of non-industrial use in total energy requirements, and the share of oil in total
energy requirements. The study concluded that the countries rank as follows in order of
increasing oil saving capacity: Japan, Italy, Belgium, France, United Kingdom , Germany,
the Netherlands, Canada and the United States. IMF SURVEY, Jan. 7, 1974, at 5.
14. The Japanese are quite aware of their vulnerability to supply cutback. They
receive between 70% and 80% of their oil from the major oil companies, none of which is
Japanese. In 1972, Japan depended on imports for 83.5% of its energy and close to 100%
of its oil. Approximately 81% of that oil came from the Middle East. NAT'L J. REP., 1973,
at 1544.
15. This is also true of those countries whose economies are in the early stages of the
industrialization process.
16. See note 12 supra. See also NAT'L J. REP., 1973, at 1546.
17. It should be kept in mind that not all oil exporting countries have engaged in
production or export restrictions. See note 7 supra.
18. Looking at the embargo from a totally apolitical perspective, at least one point
becomes clear. The uses to which oil has traditionally been put are ultimately wasteful of
a precious and highly versatile commodity. As the Shah of Iran noted in an English
language television broadcast early this year, there is something perverse about burning
oil to run an industrialized society indefinitely. He suggested the wisdom ofrapid conversion to alternate energy sources so as to divert the world 's remaining oil stocks to the
petrochemical industry which could then convert the crude into a variety of products for
which there is a current and growing world demand. Such a sentiment, if acted upon ,
would have a two-edged effect upon international commerce.
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Thus, a rather glaring discrepancy exists between the assumption
of adequate, inexpensive and dependable oil supplies and the reality of
deliberately created petroleum supply shortfall. The scramble for oil at
almost any price 19 early this yea:r illustrates the difficulty of determining
what constitutes "inexpensive" at any given moment. However, two
observations can be made.
The first is that a 300 to 400 percent increase 20 in the price of any
basic commodity so radically alters the cost of goods produced through
its use, that they must find acceptance in a totally different marketplace
from the one for which the industry was designed. It would be difficult
to overstate the significance of these developments for industrialized
society. At any time such a radical disruption of a key commodity price
would create a vortex capable of wrecking an entire economy. 21 However,
this unique transnational disruption comes at a time when (a) institutions designed to coordinate, moderate, integrate and strengthen world
economies are foundering in confusion and discord, 22 (b) a particularly
virulent "stagflation" 23 seems certain to frustrate merely national attempts at recovery, and (c) nations, rather than growing independent
of oil, will become increasingly dependent upon it. 24
19. Prices last November were as high as $22 per barrel. By mid-March they had
settled at $8 for the same quantity of the same grade. N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1974, at 45,
col. 8.
20. The possibility of such a wide difference in cost is merely reflective of the currently wide range of prices paid for Middle-Eastern crude oil. It should also be noted that
qualitative factors still exist.
21. The most serious domestic crisis of the Kennedy administration was the threatened steel price hike and the events surrounding it. Steel, like oil, is a basic commodity.
A rise in its price is reflected in ensuing months in the prices of goods manufactured
through its use, a phenomenon known as the "ripple effect." Thus, from the standpoint
of inflation, price increases in basic commodities are of the most virulent type.
With regard to the interaction of commodity cost escalation and world currency
inflation see generally: Wolman, lnfiation! It's Bad but Maybe Not Cataclysmic, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 10, 1974, § 3, at 1, col. 1; Mullaney, lnfiation, The No. 1 Foe, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 24, 1974, § 3, at 14, col. 1; Malabre, America First/US. lnfiation Now Exceeds
Increase in Many Other Lands, Wall Street J., Mar. 13, 1974, at 1, col. 6; lNT'L CURRENCY
REV., Nov./Dec. 1973, at 24-33. With regard to capital spending in light of this shortage/inflation interaction, see. Golden, Capital-Spending Plans Gain/Energy Shortage Has
Been Spur, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1974, at 35, col. 1.
22. The recent history of both the International Montary Fund and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has belied the existence of a genuine determination to
deal effectively with such problems as world inflation, balance of payments distortions,
currency realignment and unfair trade practices. This is not an institutional shortcoming,
but rather the lack of sincere input on the part of the governments constituting the bodies.
23. This is the name which has been attached to a situation which combines a
generalized slowdown in economic growth with declining purchasing value of currency.
See generally N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1974, at 53, col. 5.
24. Although the United States now imports only 16% of its oil from the Middle East,
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The second observation flows directly from the first. A kind of domino effect is at work in the international trade arena. It is a bewildering
system which has never really been charted, 25 but its basic logic can be
rather easily understood. The price of a vital commodity, oil, has increased, not moderately but rapidly. Old markets traded goods made
with and from 26 oil at the old, radically lower price. The old market did
reasonably well. It should have, for it evolved rather slowly and adjusted
more or less obediently to events. Now, that old market is being asked
to trade the far more expensive goods made with and from the far more
expensive oil; and to an extent which may prove surprising, it will do
so. However, the real question is not whether or not the market will
adapt, but rather, how it ought to adapt so as to minimize dislocations.
In so phrasing the question, the issue becomes one of structures, techniques and mechanisms-the tools of the international trader and the
province of the international commercial lawyer.
There is another dimension to the generalized plight of the net oil
importing countries. That is the jolting trauma sustained by the economies of the world's developing nations. The majority of Latin America, 27 the newly formed Caribbean Community, 28 vast stretches of Africa2!1 and the Asian subcontinent30 have all suffered recent economic
reversals. Among the chief causes has been the inability to acquire inexpensive oil. While the nature of the problem is essentially the same as
for the industrialized countries (untenable price and supply assumptions), the operational effect has not been merely dislocation, but tragedy.
Lastly, two European nations, the United Kingdom 31 and Italy, 32
which had been making progress toward stronger economies have seen
these trends reversed due largely to oil and oil-related matters.

b.

Net Oil Exporting Countries

There were two major achievements of the net oil exporting counit may depend on those areas for as much as 40% of its oil by 1980. NAT'L J. REP., 1973,
at 1540.
25. But see notes 76-79 infra and accompanying text .
26. The phrase "with and from" is used advisedly since oil is used extensively both
as a constituent raw material of the petrochemical industry and as the driving force of
the internal combustion engine.
27 . Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Surinam, Uruguay and Paraguay must all import oil.
Columbia will soon become a net oil importer. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1974, § 4, at 29, col.
3.
28. Id., Feb . 18, 1974, at 42, col. 1.
29. Id., Mar. 17, 1974, § 1, at 20, col. 6.
30. Id., Feb. 26, 1974, at 52, col. 4.
31. Id., Mar. 14, 1974, at 57, col. 2.
32. Id., Feb . 19, 1974, at 47, col. 6.
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tries during the past quarter: they succeeded in dramatically increasing
their revenues, 3:J and OPEC became a household word. Both are the
direct result of a consciously and tenaciously pursued policy, and while
both will benefit the exporters in diverse ways, they each harbor a potential danger for these countries. While these currently appear only as
scattered clouds on an otherwise glorious horizon, they may prove significant in the months to come.
Initially, the exporters are faced with the deceptively difficult problem of proper resource allocation. For some, 34 internal investment will
require all or most of these funds. For these, the options are straightforward and the decision-making process should proceed along classical
lines. For others:i 5 however, the problem is far more complex. There is
no reason to believe that inflation and other shocks from the international monetary cross-current will somehow bypass these countries.
Thus, "economic rent maximization" 36 becomes crucial. This task becomes all the more complex in light of the reportedly ultra-conservative
investment attitude of the Arab. 37
Secondly, the heightened notoriety of OPEC would seem to restrict
the range of concerted actions which the group can seriously consider
in the future. Divisions in economic goals and political allegiance divide
the group,:111 and internally inconsistent trends are made all the more
33. OPEC is expected to earn $100 billion this year from exports. Id., Mar. 16, 1974,
at 11, col. 1.
34. Algeria, Iraq, Indonesia, Egypt and Nigeria fall into this group. See id., Feb. 17,
1974 § 4, at 3, col. 8.
35. These would include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait and
Libya.
36. In an attempt to make informed investment decisions, certain unspecified Arabs
have reportedly solicited bids from major United States consulting concerns for a pricing
study. The specific information they seek is the cost to industrialized nations of acquiring
alternate energy sources. Once they are in receipt of this figure they can compute a price
for oil which will in effect just undercut that switchover cost. This price would presumably
guarantee a steady market for their oil and thus assure a steady, if fixed, income. With
this income information, financial counselors will then be able to plot a comprehensive
investment plan. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1974, at 45, col. 6.
37. There have been clear indications from Saudi Arabia, by far the largest potential
surplus earner, that it is more interested in joint venture investments at home and elsewhere in the Middle East than in the United States. In response, several United States
based companies are in various stages of planning joint ventures in Saudi Arabia. They
include: Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp., Marconal Corp., Bechtel Corp., Dow
Chemical Co., M. W. Kellogg Co., PPG Industries Inc., Houston Natural Gas Corp., Caltex Petroleum Corp., Hercules Inc., General Motors Corp., United States Steel Corp.,
American Oil Co., W.R. Grace and Co., Mobil Oil Corp., Transcontinental Gas Pipeline
Corp., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., and Kidder, Peabody Co. Inc.
Since there are no reporting requirements for foreign investments made in the United
States, it is impossible to tell with certainty how much money the producing countries
are investing in this country. NAT'L J. REP., 1973, 1215.
38. Net importing countries will certainly be looking for ways in which they can
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visible by the new-found notoriety. 39 In the complex chemistry that is
international affairs, this could well force a substantial change in the
internal dynamics and external effectiveness of the Organization.

c.

Trade Relationships

As the sections above indicate, the oil shortage per se (as distinct
from any additional shortages caused by the embargo 40) has had a
marked impact upon trade relationships. However it is useful to risk
blurring the distinction between the two, and to view the embargo
shortage together with the shortage per se. For while distinct, their
influences upon world trade relationships interacted for a period of five
months. A certain phenomenon emerged from that interaction and has
become discernible. It involves oil and is apparently limited to it at this
time. However it is potentially applicable (at least in theory) to several
other commodities. This phenomenon has come to be known as resource
diplomacy.
The underlying principle is simple and the motivation apparent.
Following OPEC's example, countries producing key primary products
band together, fix steep prices and keep supply at a level just below
world demand. Thus, the theory goes, profits are maximized, national
wealth redistributed from the relatively rich to the relatively poor and,
in the process, a way is conveniently found for the primary goods producer to meet his recently increased oil bill. However, this theoretical
scenario is oversimplified. Several specific conditions must be satisfied
before the required united action can take place and before such action
can bring about results. If such were not the case, the OPEC phenomenon would be far more familiar than it currently is. First, such cartels
must take advantage of demand that is relatively insensitive to price
hikes. Secondly, substitute products cannot be readily available at
better prices. Thirdly, large financial reserves and relative indepen-

subtly exploit these natural diffenmces. Even within the strictly Arab portion of OPEC
there are sharp divisions. As one observer wrote recently,
When Israel is not at issue, Saudis are contemptuous of everyone else, Syrians
are outcasts, Iraqis are at odds with all their neighbors, and, in general, there is
a wide variety of different opinions on any subject. Nor is there much love lost
between Arab capitals when money is at stake, and that means oil.
It must be noted that Iraq is not a member of OPEC, but the fact of a multifaceted rather
than a monolithic OPEC structure becomes clear. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1973, § 6
(Magazine), at 98, col. 4.
39. For example, the public disagreement displayed between Venezuelian Oil Minister, Valentin Hernandez and his Saudi counterpart, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki al-Yamani on
March 16 over the question of a price reduction. Id., Mar. 17, 1974, at 13, col. 1.
40. It is not at all certain what fraction of the gasoline shortage in the United States
during the period of the embargo was, in fact, due to the embargo.
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dence from short-run fortunes of the commodity in question are almost
essential since they enable the producer to survive the foreseeable
periods of limited output. Though less critical, two other factors are of
considerable importance. Since such a scheme is essentially international collusion, the fewer the producers and the fewer the rivalries
among them, the greater will be the chances for success. Lastly, a
powerful leader can be of decisive importance. 41
In addition to OPEC, several other commodity cartels have been
formed recently. The leading non-North American copper producers
have formed CIPEC. 42 While it is not at all clear which is cause and
which is effect, the price of copper for nearby delivery nearly doubled
during the last six months of last year. 43 In a similar move, seven nations
producing a majority of the world's bauxite 44 have formed the International Association of the Producers of Bauxite. 45 Meanwhile, the coffee
cartel is so well established that its members allowed the onceprotective International Coffee Agreement to expire early last year. 46
Possibilities for further producer initiatives exist in tin, natural rubber,
timber, tea, cocoa and pepper. 47
The outlook for producer cartels is not, however, as bearish as it
might appear to be. While commodity prices are currently at record or
near record highs, the cause of this (with the exception of oil) is not
cartel pressure. Rather it is extraordinary world-wide economic expansion. Secondly, to a certain extent these prices reflect a flight from
depreciable currencies into real goods. 48 These factors do not directly
bear upon the ability of producers to create effective cartels and impose
sustained high prices. In and of themselves they certainly fail to make
out a compelling case for a truly effective cartel. The political difficulties inherent in such an attempt, as well as the diffuse nature of most
primary goods, combine to weigh the odds heavily against success. For
example, after careful consideration the bauxite group decided not to
impose an embargo. Their rationale was simple: it was clear that consumers would have shifted to alternate sources of supply. 49
41. See generally Bergsten, The World May Have to Live with Shortages, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 27, 1974, § 4, at 3, col. 3.
42. CIPEC stands for Conseil Intergouvernmental des Pays Exportateurs de Cuivre.
Its members are: Chile, Peru, Zaire and Zambia. Id.
43. Id.
44. Bauxite is the ore from which alumina is extracted. It is alumina which is then
processed into aluminum.
45. They are: Guinea, Australia, Guyana, Jamaica, Sierre Leona, Surinam and Yugoslavia. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1974, at 55, col. 12.
46. Id., Feb. 2, 1974, at 37, col. 1.
47. See note 41 supra.
48. See notes 115-17 infra and accompanying text.
49. See note 45 supra.
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While the next few months may well see the formation of producers'
organizations in a number of commodity areas, there will not be a proliferation of OPEC's; that is, there will be no mass movement toward true
price-setting cartels. What appears far more likely are wide fluctuations
in the real 50 price of primacy goods as supply and demand conditions
change. On balance, inflation, as well as genuine shortage and buyer
confusion will combine to keep those fluctuations decidedly on the upward course they are now traveling. 51
Thus, while resource diplomacy is currently exerting only a fraction
of its potential influence upon the market, two facts must be kept in
mind with regard to it. The first is that there is currently no international body effectively working to moderate the substantial dislocations
in trade relationships which existing resource diplomacy has caused.
The second fact to be kept in mind is that by 1985 the United States
will have to import approximately one-half of all its essential raw materials.52 That is to say that it will be absolutely dependent upon them,
and in a very real sense, upon the suppliers of them. 53
50. A real price is one which discounts inflation absolutely and thus concentrates
solely upon constant value relative to other goods.
51. Josefik, Sudden Sell-Off/But Infiation Still a Factor, Wall Street J., Mar. 8, 1974,
at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as Josefik].
52. Reston, Two Tanks in Every Tent, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1974, at 15, col. 1.
53. One of the most noteworthy of all occurrences during the last quarter involves the
suspension of all non-disbursed Export-Import Bank credits for proposed deals involving
the Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia. While the technicalities of the dispute are themselves interesting, the key aspect of the suspension insofar as resource
diplomacy is concerned is the subject matter of the specific deal which prompted the
suspension. For over one year credits had been extended to Soviet-bloc countries under a
very loose interpretation of the enabling legislation. While this was a matter of public
record there had been no objections. However, when during the height of the energy frenzy
credits were sought for a $49;5 million natural gas exploitation project in the Soviet Union,
Senator Richard Schweiker goaded the General Accounting Office to enforce the rather
explicit letter of the law. The G.A.O. ordered the suspension and an opinion from the
Attorney General is currently pending. In explaining his action Senator Schweiker made
reference to a potential of $6.1 billion in Export-Import Bank credits,
I can't conceive of how any President could make the determination now that
exporting $6.1 billion of American capital for energy development in the Soviet
Union would be in the national interest.
The clear implication is that if the money is to be spent, it should be invested in a country
where the long-range political climate offers some substantial assurance of uninterrupted
supply to the United States. Id. Mar. 22, 1974, at 55, col. 7; id., Mar. 12, 1974, at 54, col.
3.
In pertinent part the statute of the Export-Import Bank reads as follows:
(2) The bank in the exercise of its functions shall not guarantee, insure or
extend credit, or participate in any extension of credit(A) in connection with the purchase or lease of any product by a Communist country . . . , or agency or national thereof, . . . except that the prohibitions contained in this paragraph shall not apply in the case of any transaction
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INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH THE SHORTAGE OF OIL

a.

Governmental

From the foregoing sections it becomes clear that the existing structure of international trade and the organizations charged with regulating and facilitating it have failed to keep pace with the needs of the
international trading community. This section focuses upon recent attempts by Western industrialized society to deal with the oil shortage
and its impact upon the world economy.
Essentially two types of attempts have been made. They differ
radically, both conceptually, and in operation and effect. The first,
proposed and practiced by the French, is the ancient doctrine of "sauve
qui peut" or, roughly, "every man for himself." It results in bilateralism.51 The second, proposed by the United States, involves multilateralism"" and interdependence. This interdependence extends not only to
the economies of industrialized nations but to the broad range of international occurrences affecting them. 56
The French position is easily understood. During the embargo many
nations had engaged in what at times appeared to be a mad rush to buy
oil for short and mid-range delivery, at almost any price. 57 As the midFebruary, Washington energy conference was convened, such unilateral
action was the rule rather than the exception. Indeed, at the conference
French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert cited a published report of seven
countries then attempting to conclude bilateral contracts with oil producers.58 When he characterized the list as incomplete, no one challenged the truth of his statement.
which the President determines would be in the national interest if he reports
that determination to the Senate and the House of Representatives within thirty
days after making the same.
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 § 2(b)(3), Pub. L. No. 90-267, § l(c), 82 Stat. 47 as
amended, 12 U.S.C .A. § 635(b)(2), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
The nub of the legal controversy is whether or not the President has the statutory
authority to classify trade with a designated "Communist" country as being per se in the
national interest, or if he rather is required to make an individualized finding for each
proposed project and present those findings to the Congress in cases where he does find
trade to be in the national interest.
54. Bilateralism: so called because unilateral buyer action results in bilateral contracts.
55. Multilateralism: so called because the buyers present the sellers with a united
group. The resulting contract is thus common to all the buyers, or multilateral.
56. Chief among these have been strategic considerations. Silk, Energy Talks: Why
the U.S. Position Won, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1974, at 43, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as U.S.
Position].
57. See note 19 supra.
58. U.S. Position, supra note 56, at 43, col. 1.
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It was not until this conference that the several aspects of the American position on multilateralism were thoroughly integrated and clearly
presented to the industrialized West. At the heart of the American
strategy was (and is) the proposition that in the long run the price of
oil
be lower than it fs now-at least in "real" terms. Secretary of
State Kissinger presented a seven point proposal embodying the American multilateral position. 59 The first three points ·bore directly upon the
realization of a lower oil price through conservation 60 and the development of alternate energy sources. The fourth point advocated a system
of energy sharing61 which, in addition to mitigating the effects of an
embargo, contains the potential for helping reduce disorder in the hy:persensitive international oil market. 62 The last three points were directed at institution building, with regard to both producer/consumer
relations and also the vital area of oil revenue recycling. 63
The American position was couched in the economic philosophy
known as Pareto-optimality; 64 optimum economic efficiency is achieved
when no one can be made better off without making someone else worse
off. Secretary Kissinger suggested that the aim of all nations should be
to achieve this optimality on an international scale, and that multilateralism was the proper means to that end. The American position was
accepted over the vigorous objections and dissensions of the French·
ministers.
From a purely tactical standpoint, the United States succeeded
because of two key characteristics in its approach and one very important fact of life. It established realistic goals which were widely acceptable and which genuinely served the interests of the joint community.
Secondly, it subtly but decidedly linked economic and security matters. 65 Lastly, the strengthening American economic position, its sub-

will

59. Id., at 53, col. 3.
60. Mr. Kissinger spoke in terms of a "new energy ethic". Id.
61. Id., col. 4. There is a certain anomoly in the United States calling for a system of
sharing. As of the fall of 1973 the United States government had no stockpiles of oil and
no policy on stockpiles of oil. Most other major industrialized countries did. While the
amount of the stockpiles varied, they averaged around the sixty day level. Traditionally,
attempts at reaching sharing agreements have been thwarted by a fundamental split over
whether a sharing program should apply only to imported oil or to imported oil and
domestic oil both. NAT'L J. REP., 1973, at 1547.
62. Uncertainty over supply is perhaps the chief factor behind inflationary beggarthy-neighbor runs on a commodity. To the extent that such an assured supply would limit
uncertainty, it would help stabilize the market by its sheer presence.
63. The periods when the world's monetary systems have worked well were when
surplus countries invested their surpluses overseas. INT'L CURRENCY REv., Jan./Feb. 1974,
at 34.
64. Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923); Italian economist. Silk, Kissinger as Economist,
N .Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1974, at 53, col. 7.
65. U.S. Position, supra note 56, at 43, col. 3. The Europeans in general and the
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stantial energy supplies, 66 its premiere technological capability and its
unparalleled capital market, 67 all combined to form a pillar of comparative certainty toward which the other nations were attracted at a time
of great confusion. 68
The thirteen nations participating in the conference issued a joint
communique at its conclusion. 69 In it they proposed that they monitor
oil related problems through their participation _in existing international
organizations such a~ the OECD 70 and the IMF 71 when the nature of the
problems were such that this method was possible. In addition, it agreed
to the formation of temporary working groups on projects for which there
were no other suitable bodies. 72
Since the conclusion of the conference, the United States has continued to advocate multilateralism and the French have been actively
engaged (along with an indeterminate number of other countries) in
bilateral efforts to secure oil. Although neither party admits it, 73 there
Germans in particular are very sensitive to the issue of continued United States military
presence. Well aware of this, and eager to proceed on the economic front, President Nixon
made a point of saying the following at a recent news conference.
In the event that Congress gets the idea that we are going to be faced with
economic confrontation and hostility from the Nine, you will find it almost
impossible to get Congressional support for continued American presence at
present levels on the security front.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1974, at 4, col. 4.
66. As noted above, the United States is currently the world's greatest producer of
oil. See note 12 supra. In addition, the United States has the world's greatest coal reserve
and it possesses advanced nuclear technology.
67. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1974, at 39, col. 7.
68. The very fact of a fully synthesized and logically presented proposal was in itself
a serious factor weighing in favor of its adoption.
69. Succeeding on a procedural point, France was permitted to register dissent in the
document. This was acceptable to the United States since it was official policy to do
everything possible not to unduly alienate the French whose co-operation is needed if the
NA TO and EEC documents on new structures of unity between the United States and
Europe are to be completed.
70. OCED, or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, is a
United Nations affiliated group of 24 countries. The purpose of the group is to jointly
explore matters of international economic significance. To that end it engages in research,
serves as a forum for economic debate and periodically publishes studies of current international economic developments. Its members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. IMF SURVEY, Jan. 7, 1974, at 1, col.
3.
71. See note 133 infra and accompanying text.
72. No additional information was forthcoming on what these topics might be. It is
difficult to conceive of a topic over which neither the IMF nor the OECD would have
subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, if these temporary working groups are convened it will
most likely be for convenience purposes.
73. As for American desires for calm, see note 69 supra. As for the French, M. Jacques
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is a very real confrontation in progress. 74 Oil is vital and that fact renders
critical policies affecting the supply of oil. However, the outcome has a
significance extending even beyond oil. The decision of the international
community with respect to oil, and whether to act alone or in concert
in attempts to secure it, will set a weighty precedent which is of the
greatest importance in view of projected supply shortfalls.

b.

Institutional

Governmental attempts to build an international framework for
dealing with the impact of commodity shortages upon trade relationships are not completely alone. This framework, if indeed it is ever
realized, will necessitate goals and institutionalized means for attaining
them. The determination of precise goals will itself pose a knotty problem for an international community of such a diverse nature. 75 Assuming, however, that specific goals can be agreed upon, there remains the
second hurdle of the institutionalized means for attaining them. There
is nothing inherent within even the finest institution which guarantees
its success. Success depends rather upon two factors: the willingness of
the participants to work together to realize that success, and, equally
as important, the ability to effectively act upon that community will.
In the realm of international trade, that ability requires a body of
knowledge never before amassed: the precise mechanics of international
commerce, including the impact of commodity shortage upon it. A
unique international entity has been formed for the purpose of acquiring
this knowledge. It is a hybrid of governmentaF 6 and international cooperation with what are essentially private institutions, primarily universities and institutes. Based at the Wharton School of the University
of Pennsylvania, the project, known as Link, continuously coordinates
economic data on the foreign trade sectors of individual countries. 77
Kosciusko-Morizet, the Ambassador to the United States was recently quoted as saying,
"I do not see this crisis. I do not see the slightest sign of hostility or confrontation." N.Y.
Times, Mar. 18, 1974, at 5, col. 1.
74. On March 16, it was reported that during the preceding month American oil
companies had sold, or dumped, two million tons of crude onto European markets at
prices substantially below the $10.50 per barrel which the French had locked themselves
into in a bilateral purchasing agreement with an Arab source. It was an obvious attempt
to dissuade consumers from entering into long term arrangements with the Arabs at
current price levels. Id., Mar. 17, 1974, at 1, col. 8.
75. Once the decision has been made to pursue Pareto-optimality the hard question
becomes the quantification of "goods." Even in good faith, countries are certain to differ
sharply due to cultural predilections as well as more partisan factors.
76. The project is financed by the Social Science Research Council, the National
Science Foundation and the IMF. Golden, Linking Up the World Energy Crisis, N.Y.
Times, Jan . 27, 1974, § 3, at 1, col. 3.
77. Link utilizes what is known as econometric model building and proceeds to mar-
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In contrast to the actual working of the system, which is reportedly
the most sophisticated in the world, the theory behind it is clearcut.
Assuming that the world economy is shaped by the interaction of a
variety of factors and does not simply evolve, it is assumed that these
factors must exert varying and specific impacts upon the overall system. Starting with quite simple observations, these factors are then
quantified, different weights being assigned to each factor. The weights
are dynamic, that is, they are subject to change in any given analysis,
depending upon the other factors which the project directors 78 feel are
involved in the real-world situation which the analysis is attempting to
emulate. In this fashion the experience of history is brought to bear upon
the convoluted calculus of contemporary trade problems.
During the past quarter, Link directors were among the first to
conclude that the effect of the oil embargo would primarily be higher
prices and not an economic slowdown due to inability to acquire oil. The
result has been an impressive short-run record. If this reliability continues to improve, 79 it will mark a watershed not only in the development
of a more orderly pattern of international commerce, but in economic
history as a whole.
On a more mundane level, the system has a significance which
transcends the obvious forecasting value for the international entrepreneur. Combined with the multilateral or interdependent approach to
world petroleum shortage adopted in principle at the Washington energy conference, it could become a valuable tool with which to defuse
future commodity crises.
B.
1.

The Shortage of Food
SCOPE

A trend has developed within the past several months which threatens to aggravate the world's perennial food shortage. 80 While it is not yet
ket projections by means of the simultaneous solution of a great number of equations. The
whole complex system is held together by the simple notion that total world exports must
equal total world imports. Id., at 4, cols. 4-8.
78. The system is under the direction of Prof. Lawrence Klein and is supervised on a
day to day basis by an economist, Keith Johnson.
79. Accuracy should continue to improve since with each computer run the system
learns more about how various market factors interact. This knowledge is retained through
constant updating of the master program against which all new data is evaluated.
80. There is a certain perversity in referring to a food shortage and limiting discussion
to its effects upon international commerce. It is currently estimated that one and one-half
billion persons are malnourished to the point of being physically underdeveloped and an
additional five hundred million are believed to be starving to death. N.Y. Times, Mar.
15, 1974, at 28, col. 4.
While industrialized countries are only now beginning to feel the effects of the world
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clear, it may affect consumers in industrialized nations who have traditionally been insulated from such concerns. 81
Two conceptualizations of the nature and probable impact of the
trend are currently being aired. The first is typified by the official policy
of the United States government. It acknowledges a "current food gap"
but suggests that this could well be followed by a "food glut". 82 While
sympathizing with the need for stockpiles, it concludes that the longrange situation will mirror what it sees as the experience of the last
several decades-generally adequate supplies punctuated with occasional shortages. 83 The opposing view draws a sharper focus upon the
current shortage, upon what it sees as a generalized private and governmental insensitivity to the problem, and upon an ominous shift in world
weather patterns. 84 Its conclusion is pessimistic.
The government has relied heavily upon statistics from the Department of Agriculture which recently indicated that farmers were pressing
ahead with plans for a sharp expansion in crop acreage for summer 1974
harvesting. In view of assurances of adequate fertilizer, Department
economists reaffirmed their earlier predictions of record plantings in
major grains. 85 However, even in view of the markedly greater acreage
in use, the official projection was for "ample" food supplies, 86 not the
substantial surplus which would be necessary for stockpiling. 87
food shortage, the economies of a large group of nations are suffering far more seriously.
The agriculture of certain regions of South America, the Sahel region in Africa south of
the Sahara, and the entire Asian sub-continent has been devastated by drought and
drought/flood cycles. The Guyanan rice and sugar crops have been destroyed. Chad, an
area which only thirty years ago exported grain, is now a virtual wasteland and the cattle
of the Taureg and the Peul are dead and the people near starvation. Nigeria, Cameroun,
Dahomey, Togo, Ghana and the Ivory Coast have seen their peanut, cocoa and coffee crop
yields plunge drastically. In addition to this climate-caused disaster the hopes of all these
countries have recently received another setback. At the very time that they required
increased crop yield, the fertilizer through which such yields could possibly have been
achieved became too expensive to afford. Most fertilizers used in large-scale agriculture
are synthetic and petroleum based. The recent price hikes have not spared the third world.
81. One of the effects has already been felt. Food cost at the retail level is at a record
high and threatens to go higher still. The other effect could be a change in the international political climate. See note 97 infra.
82. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1974, at 39, col. 4.
83. Id.
84. See generally Alexander, The Ominous Shift in Weather Patterns, FORTUNE, Feb.,
1974, at 90.
85. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1974, at 37, col. 1.
86. Id.
87. The world's stockpile of food grains is extremely thin. The 178 million bushels in
the United States along with several hundred million in Canada and some additional
wheat in a few other industrialized countries constitute the total world supply of grain. It
is probable that aggregate world holdings of grains at the end of the current crop year this
summer will be equal to approximately one month's needs. Id., Feb. 24, 1974, § 3, at 12,
col. 8.
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In rejoinder, spokesmen for those who foresee a far less secure supply situation in the months ahead take issue not with the accuracy of
the government's data, but rather with its significance and interpretation. They see the corn and wheat acreage rises as largely a function of
two negative factors. The first is that American cattle herds, traditionally an integral part of United States protein supply, are currently far
below normal size. This has obviated the need for much of the sorghum
which would normally be used as feed. A good deal of the sorghum
acreage has consequently been shifted to wheat production. Thus, a
substantial portion of the enlarged wheat planting is accounted for at
the ultimate expense of meat protein. A second factor contributing to
the projected wheat increase, it is said, is the utilization of marginal
land, which cannot be seriously relied upon to produce in the amounts
that government analysts predict. 88 Additionally, these critics point out
that the government estimates are based upon assumptions of optimal
growing conditions. This is especially true for winter wheat for which
optimal conditions include the moisture it receives from melting snowcover in the spring. Broad areas of the American wheat belt were free
of snow throughout much of the 1973-74 winter, 89 due perhaps to a shift
in the path of moisture-bearing winds. 90 It is not now known if the rain
which was deposited during early March 91 was in sufficient amount to
offset the lack of thaw moisture. It is thus impossible to determine at
this time the precise scope of the projected shortage, or if there will
indeed be a shortage of crisis proportion.
Regardless of which projection for the 197 4 harvest proves more
accurate it is undisputed that current United States grain carryover is
the lowest in 27 years. 92 As a result of this, and looking to the various
demands upon that supply, one trade association recently estimated
that the United States would experience a grain shortfall of nearly one
million bushels during the current year. 93 While this too is disputed by
Agriculture Department officials, 94 it becomes clear that if the United
States does have enough grain to meet all its commitments during the
coming year it will be by only a slim margin. If the harvest is at all below
official estimates, shortfall is virtually assured since carryover will have
been taxed to its limit in meeting current demands. 96
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id., Mar. 15, 1974, at 43, col. 2.
Id., Feb. 26, 1974, at 58, col. 5.
See note 84 supra.
Wall Street J., Mar. 12, 1974, at 32, col. 2.
Kneeland, Wheat Stocks Depleted, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1974, at 20, col.. 2.
Id., at col. 3.
See note 85 supra.
See note 92 supra.
Demand is loosely categorized as follows: foreign sector (exports of all types),
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SIGNIFICANCE

Insofar as international commerce is concerned, however, occurrence or non-occurrence of a food shortage in the United States during
the current year is of only secondary importance to another fact. That
fact is the existence of a bona fide shortfall threat, and the impact which
that threat is exerting97 upon the trade policies of the international
community .
The question confronting the international trading community is
whether the United States (or other net exporters finding themselves in
a similar shortfall situation 98 ) would make the political decision to interfere with the flow of grain in the international market. Certainly the
power to do so exists 99 and parochial pressure to restrict exports would
be enormous. 100 Further, the threat is by no means purely theoretical.
There is sufficient recent precedent to make the threat of interference
through export controls very real. 101
3.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Currently North American agribusiness is heavily involved in selling grain to foreign markets. During the last several years these sales
have become routine and foreign governments have come to rely upon
a ready source of supply in either the United States or Canada. 102 Until
home market (in-country sales of all types). Not all grain retained after exports is home
market, however. A large portion of each year's crop must be recommitted to the earth as
seed. Additional portions are used as cattle feed.
97. The present tense is used advisedly. As is apparent from the tone of this section,
the major consequences of any shortfall are prospective insofar as further price increases
and consumer hardship are concerned. However, the impact of a possible shortage is
currently being felt by political and trade relationships. The philosophy of Agriculture
Secretary Butz is that if Americans are to trade in a free world market they must pay the
going price for products, even those that are raised in great surplus at home . Undoubtedly,
there are those who will disagree. See Kneeland, Consumers in U.S. Face Competition For
Nation 's Food, N .Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1974, at 46, col. 4.
98. Controls need not necessarily be governmental. Despite a heavy increase in Canadian wheat production last year farmers have generally refrained from delivering it to
elevators for sale. Id., Feb. 19, 1974, at 47, col. 7.
99. State sovereignty recognized by international law would include such action.
Further, international law at least arguably recogtiizes a government's obligation to provide for the welfare of its citizens even to the point of abrogating trade agreements or
customs. S ee RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 153
(1965).
100. People the world over feel a special interest in food grown within the borders of
their country. Psychologically, the line between interest and preemptive right is easily
crossed.
101. On June 27, 1973 the Commerce Department imposed an embargo upon the
export of cottonseed oils and soybeans. On July 5 it imposed export controls upon 41
categories of agricultural commodities. Soybeans and cottonseed oils were included among
these 41, none of which could be exported from the United States without a validated
license. These restrictions remained in force until September 7. NAT'L J. REP. , 1973, at
1034, 1046.
102. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1974, at 39, col. 4.
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recently this situation was welcomed, especially by the United States.
During the late sixties and early seventies grain sales provided a
substantial portion of the revenue inflow that held the United States
balance of payments deficit within acceptable limits. More recently,
due to the celebrated 1972 Soviet wheat deal, 103 it even made possible
the first United States trade surplus in several years. However, faced
with a general rise in world demandrn 4 and strong America-first domestic
pressure, 105 the Nixon administration has made it clear that it no longer
wishes to be looked to for assured supplies. 106 Simultaneously, the administration has relaxed a number of legal impediments to the importation of food 107 and quietly appropriated substantial funds for crash research and development programs so as to increase grain and protein
supply. 108
The Soviet Union, enjoying record harvests, 109 has consented to
defer delivery of scheduled United States wheat shipments. 110 It has,
however, deemed it prudent to commit $44 billion over five years to the
agricultural development of vast tracts of currently marginal Siberian
land. 111
4.

OUTLOOK

While not yet at a crisis stage, the once assured position of industrialized nations with respect to food has been seriously called into
question. For the first time, it is being asked whether some entity other
than the naked force of supply and demand has the responsibility for
establishing a world grain stockpile, 112 and an international policy to
103. In an interesting sidelight to the question of the shortage of food, the G.A.O.
officially announced on February 12 that it could find no evidence of any wrongdoing
within the Department of Agriculture with respect to the October 1972 wheat sales to the
Soviet Union. Id., Feb. 13, 1974, at 55, col. 2.
104. See note 81 supra.
105. This faction has been led in recent months by the American Baker's Association.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
106. See note 82 supra.
107. By proclamation the President suspended limitations on the importation of
wheat and milled wheat products (39 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1974)) and meat (39 Fed. Reg. 7777
(1974)). Further, he augmented the amount of cheddar cheese which could come into the
country without import license by 100,000,000 pounds (39 Fed. Reg. 959 (1974)).
108. On January 29 the Department of Agriculture placed a notice in the Federal
Register soliciting research proposals involving genetic work with the soybean. Funding
was to be in the maximum amount of $400,000; work to be completed within five years.
39 Fed. Reg. 3700 (1974) .
109. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1974, at 6, col. 6.
110. Id., Feb. 26, 1974, at 20, col. 6. The amount deferred was reportedly 37 million
bushels.
111. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1974 at 6, col. 4.
112. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1974, § 3 at 12, col. 3.
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regulate it. In view of the lethargy which characterizes all international
initiatives, the answer to that question will evolve quite slowly. It will
be influenced by factors bearing no relation to food allocation or nutritional needs, other than that both questions will exist in the international arena at the same period of time and expediency will dictate
trade-offs. But an answer of sorts will evolve. Its specific nature will
have a profound effect upon the manner in which international commerce in agricultural products is conducted, and consequently, upon the
shape of international commercial law.

C.

Activity in Commodity Futures Markets

1.

NON-PRECIOUS METALS

Motivated by developments in the supply situations of oil, food and
other real goods, investors combined to exert unprecedented pressure on
world commodity markets during the last quarter. While the net result
upon the current price of almost all commodities purchased for future
delivery 113 was a drastic rise, analysts cautioned that sharp declines
could be anticipated in at least some areas.
Led by agricultural products, commodity prices reached generally
high levels in the late summer of 1973. After falling off to a slight extent
by early autumn, they again excelerated, spurred largely by two factors
emanating from the Middle East: the October War and the subsequent
oil boycott. This trend was continued and prices were driven even higher
by a truck strike in the United States early in 1974. 114
At this juncture the market became gripped by an unprecedented
psychology. 115 Rather than being used as a mechanism through which
producers and manufacturers could secure future raw material supply,
the market became an investment medium pitting traditional buyers
against speculators. In contrast to conventional practice, many purchasers were not utilizing the market for the purpose of purchasing a specific
commercial commodity. Rather, they were simply buying contracts for
whatever goods had not already risen to their daily Hmits.1 16 The result
113. The concept of purchasing a commodity for future delivery (hence the name
"future") provides certainty for industries using basic goods. It also necessitates thorough
knowledge of the supply/demand situation, not merely at the present, but at the hour of
delivery.
114. Josefik, supra note 51, at 1, col. 6.
115. While commodity markets have traditionally been considered havens for speculators against inflation, the degree to which the markets were subjected to this pressure
during the last quarter was unprecedented. Rather than essentially alien forces whose
impact was cushioned by the general market, these speculators seemed at times as though
they had captured it.
116. Most commodity markets have placed limits upon how much value an exchange
unit of any given substance may gain or lose in a single session. The rationale for this
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was a general and steep increase in prices. 117
By the end of February, however, a variety of market factors began
to exert themselves. Due to strong retail resistence to meat prices, the
cost of livestock contracts began to fall. That single reversal seemed to
spark a trend. Other factors combined in rapid succession to contribute
to the reversal. These included: reports of an imminent cessation of the
oil embargo; the decision of the Indian government to allow the sale of
sterling for export; reports of renewed Peruvian anchovy fishing; 1111 and
information indicating that both Argentina and Australia would soon
resume substantial exports of sugar and grain. 119
However, as could be expected, this trend was itselfreversed. Even
as the oil embargo was in fact lifted in mid-March most futures advanced sharply on the rationale that the influx of higher-priced Arab
crude would spur inflation. 120 The feeling was still apparently widespread that the holding of a contract for a real good at a fixed dollar
amount was the only safe investment.
There has been sharp criticism of this investment psychology and
its effects upon the commodity market. It is said that speculative investors (as distinguished from bona fide commodity tr~ders) exert an influence upon the market which compromises the traditional function of the
exchange. Currently, commodity exchanges in the United States are
largely self-regulating with only limited governmental surveillance. Federal legislation which would change that situation has proceeded rapidly
through the House Agriculture Committee. 121 This legislation has been
expedited by the speculative pressure which the exchanges have recently experienced, and the impact which that pressure has had upon
domestic and international commerce.
2.

PRECIOUS METALS GENERALLY

Nowhere was this speculative pressure upon commodities more
pronounced during the last quarter than in the world's precious metals
markets. Gold, silver and platinum were all bid up to record highs. Gold
blatant interference with market factors is that, in an imperfect world, this lends a note
of stability to prices which would otherwise succumb to rumor and irrational forces.
117. Soy, wheat, oats, corn, coffee, copper, cocoa and cotton were all at or near record
highs . N .Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1974, at 58, col. 5.
118. Id., Mar. 17, 1974, § 3, at 17, col. 1.
119. Josefik, supra note 51, at 1, col. 6.
120. N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1974, at 47, col. 5.
121. The Bill calls for a five member commission, consisting of the Secretary of
Agriculture and four public representatives. They would be invested with sweeping regulatory powers. Id., Feb. 28, 1974, at 54, col. 2. Elsewhere, similar sentiments were being
expressed. Said one Assistant Agriculture Department Secretary in conjunction with unbridled speculation, "The days of wrist-slapping are gone." Josefik, supra note 51, at 16,
col. 1.
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more than doubled in price in the twelve-month period ending February
26 when it was traded on the London Bullion Market 122 at $184 per
ounce, an increase of $60 since January l. 123 The same day, silver enjoyed its eighteenth consecutive gaining session, fifteen of which were
limit gains. 124 Because of the limitations on daily allowable price increases platinum contracts virtually ceased to be traded; there being no
sellers willing to part with it. 125
By late March the markets had experienced a "shakeout" of some
of the more emotional traders and gold had settled securely 126 at the
$160-$165 level, a price which was unthinkable less than one year before.121
3.

GOLD

The behavior of the gold price reflects three factors: first, a substantial decline in supplies of new gold oµtput and Russian sales; second, a
persistently strong increase in demand for gold for uses in industry and
the arts, as well as for investment, hedging and speculative purposes;
and third, the growing belief that in conditions of world recession coupled with inflation and compounded by the oil shortage, the governments of key countries will be forced to employ gold for their international debt settlements at market-related prices. 128 This section addresses the first two of these factors. The third · is considered in the
following section.
While speculator pressure, both rational and irrational, was clearly
the most remarkable factor influencing the unparalleled rise in gold
prices, the primary cause for the rise went largely unnoticed by those
not involved in the workings of the bullion market. It was, in fact, a
simple case of supply outstripping demand; in effect, a gold shortage.
The free world supply of market or "private sector" 129 gold fell by
as much as 140, and by no fewer than 115, tons during 1973. Most of
the reduction was accounted for by a six percent South African production cutback and five and nine percent declines for Canada and the
122. London, along with Zurich, and now Winnipeg constitute the three most important bullion exchanges in the world. N.Y. Times, F;eb. 26, 1974, at 49, col. 6; id., Mar. 19,
1974, at 53, col. 1.
123. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
124. Id., at 49, col. 3.
125. Id.
126. It seemed secure in the sense of a stable floor, not a ceiling.
127. Unthinkable for all but Mr. James Dines who has been telling the investment
world for years that the day of gold was coming. Sample declaration, "Anyone who sells
gold shares is an idiot." N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1974, § 3, at 7, col. 1.
128. INT'L CURRENCY REv., Jan./Feb. 1974, at 39.
129. This is the gold used by artisans and industrialists and is distinct from the gold
stored by governments in their central bank vaults.
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United States respectively. While hard figures are impossible to secure, 130 it seems certain that the Soviet Union sold substantially fewer
tons in Zurich last year than it had in 1972. 131
At the same time demand was rising. In the United States, gold
usage in industry and the arts during the last half of 1973 increased by
eight percent over the same period one year earlier. Percentage increases
aside, the amount used was quite high in absolute terms, approximately
240 tons. This represents an amount six times greater than the annual
United States production yield. Thus, close to eighty percent of the
private sector, United States demand had to be met through imports. 132

II.

WORLD MONETARY SITUATION

The two foremost developments in the world monetary forum during the last quarter have been direct effects of the commodity shortages
discussed above, especially that of petroleum.

A.

Background

In the years following World War II practically the entire nonCommunist world conducted international commerce under a monetary
system adopted at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 and rigidly
presided over by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Essentially,
the system provided a means through which central banks could acquire
foreign currencies required by international traders doing business in
their countries. Since they and the new system would have been meaningless abstractions without it, each currency was assigned a "par"
value. This gave it meaning (a) relative to the numeraire, 133 gold, and
(b) relative to all other participating currencies. 134 Thus, through the
instrumentality of the par value, international rates of exchange were
set. Once set, these rates could only be changed through a formal process
approved by the IMF. This system functioned relatively well for over
twenty years. Success was due in large measure to the sustained purchasing power of the United States dollar, initially and traditionally the
system's bulwark currency. For twenty years the dollar continued to
closely approximate the purchasing power of that quantity of gold to
which the system said a bearer was entitled in exchange for his dollar.
However, by 1968 the dollar had suffered so badly from a series of
130. The Soviet Union does not release statistics on gold production or sales.
131. INT'L CURRENCY REv., Jan./Feb. 1974, at 39, 40.
132. Id.
133. The numeraire of a monetary system is the common unit of account in terms of
which the relative value of all currencies is measured. Annual Report of the Council of
Economic Advisors, 1974, from an excerpt reprinted in IMF SURVEY, Feb. 18, 1974, at 57.
134. This is so since each, by virtue of its par with gold, partakes of a common
evaluator.
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balance of payments deficits that this critical equilibrium ceased to
exist. The purchasing power of the gold used to back the dollar and the
whole international system had become markedly greater than the purchasing power of what the system said was an equivalent quantum of
dollars.
In an attempt to put an end to speculation against the dollar and
restore confidence in the established rates of exchange, a group of the
West's leading trading nations agreed in March of 1968 to cease buying
and selling gold on the private market. That is, they agreed to cease
buying and selling gold for any amount other than the officially established price, which at that time was $35 per ounce. In so doing they
created a two-tiered international gold market: gold I (official), and gold
II (private). This agreement is still in force. 135 It did not, however bring
about the long-range stabilization which its creators had intended. As
illustrated in the sections above, the current price of private gold is
approximately four times the $42.22 price of official gold.
By the early 1970's the Bretton Woods fixed-rate system had so
thoroughly ceased reflecting monetary reality that a general adjustment
in exchange rates was necessitated. Accordingly, in what has come to
be known as the Smithsonian Agreement, 136 new par values for the dollar
and other currencies were established in December, 1971. The effect was
to lower the value of the dollar by 8.5 percent. However, this proved
insufficient, as did the formal ten percent devaluation of February of
last year. The speculative run against the dollar continued and
prompted the decision by major nations to abandon the par value system and allow their currencies to find their own levels through the
operation of market factors and varying degrees of central bank intervention.137 By March 1973 this free market or float system had become
the new standard. However, there was strong sentiment among many
members of the IMF for the development of a somewhat firmer approach toward currency valuation. Accordingly, a special Committee on
Reform of the International Monetary System, or the Committee of 20,
began slow but steady progress in September 1972 toward fashioning a
new structure, the nucleus of which would be a new set of exchange
rates. Ideally they would be more flexible than those promulgated at
Bretton Woods but less so than with the float. 138
135. While the agreement remains, the value of gold under the agreement has officially changed twice: once to $38 and then to $42.22.
136. So named because the conference used the buildings of the Smithsonian Institute in Washington, D.C.
137. It must be realized that all central banks do intervene in the workings of the
international monetary system. They cannot help doing so as they trade for the currencies
which businessmen in the home country require. The real question is to what degree do
they do it and how they carry it out. See note 138 infra.
138. Since the spring of 1973 some countries have permitted their currencies to float

Published by SURFACE, 1974

25

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 2, No. 1 [1974], Art. 8

1974]

Recent Developments

145

It was upon this free-floating monetary world, with gold trading
limited by agreement to the official price of $42.22, and at this stage of
development toward a new exchange rate structure, that the current raft
of commodity shortages descended.

B.

Impact

The commodity shortages have had a dual effect: they have completely postponed th0 structural reforms which the Committee of 20 had
been studying and shifted the Committee's attention towards the formulation of interim guidelines; and, they have exerted sharp pressure
upon governments to disregard their 1968 agreement to the contrary and
to sell gold at private market levels, currently in excess of $160 per
ounce.
1.

CURRENT ACTIVITY OF THE COMMITTEE OF

20

As indicated above, in September of 1972 the Committee of 20 was
charged by the IMF with exchange rate reform. The original target
deadline for the presentation of a comprehensive package was the
Fund's next annual meeting. But by the time this meeting was convened
in September of 1973 in Nairobi, the scheme had been only partially
completed. A new target date was set for the January 1974 meeting of
the Committee to be held in Rome. One month after the Nairobi conference the Arab oil embargo, with its attendant production cutbacks and
price increases, was imposed. By January the effects of this action had
so disrupted the international monetary picture that reform in the sense
of more fixed rates of currency convertibility became unrealistic. Accordingly, the finance ministers of the international trading community
directed the Committee to realign its initiative. It was instructed to
prepare two separate documents for presentation at its next meeting to
within a rather wide range, permitting market factors to establish the exchange rate.
Central banks intervened only to maintain orderly market conditions. Some countries
decided to peg their currencies to a major currency such as the dollar, allowing their rates
of exchange to rise and fall as did the major currency. Seven European countries (Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden) kept their
currencies relatively fixed with respect to each other while floating together with respect
to other countries. But regardless of what form its floating took almost every country, to
one degree or another, has intervened. It has done so by buying or selling its own or
another's currency. The goal was to keep the float within bounds it thought were economically and politically acceptable. NAT'L J. REP., 1974, at 287. France removed itself from
the float in late January in a move that proved to be more surprising than significant.
For many years France has preached monetary self-discipline to other nations and the
unannounced departure from the snake, as the joint float is known, seemed contradictory
to its fixed rate philosophy. Actually, however, central bank intervention on France's part
has kept the de facto devaluation of the franc to a modest 4%. See generally N.Y. Times,
Jan. 23, 1974, at 45, cols. 6-7; id., Mar. 8, 1974, at 43, col. 6.
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be held in June 197 4. The first was to include a collection of general
principles for permanent exchange rate reform, leaving the details for a
later time. Secondly, the Committee was instructed to give its top priority to those changes in international monetary rules necessary to cope
with the immediate effects of the oil situation. 139
With regard to the second of these matters, the ministers were
deeply concerned lest the floating system be used by any country to gain
an unfair advantage in international trade. This was, and remains, a
real possibility, at least theoretically. Since the higher price of oil will
cause sharply higher outflows of currency from all industrialized countries this year there will be a concomitant need to increase revenue so
as to meet this expense, There are a number of means which a government could pursue in attempts to achieve this increased inflow. One of
the more seductive among them involves certain central bank manipulations which bring about what has come to be known as "dirty" floating.
One certain means of increasing revenue is to increase exports and
one certain means of increasing exports is to lower the price of domestically produced goods. This makes them more affordable in the eyes of
foreign buyers. Sales rise and receipts follow. The valuation of the currency is the key.
Since the exchange rates, or relative values, of currencies are presently determined by market factors, and since the market can be affected by central bank operations, it is within the power of a government
to raise or lower the value of its currency at any given time. By buying
its currency on the open market it restricts its supply, making it harder
to acquire and of greater value. Conversely, by selling its currency in
great quantity, a government has the capability of driving its value
down. The result is that foreign buyers will more easily acquire the
amount of currency necessary to do business with exporters in the country conducting the "dirty" float. As indicated above, export revenues
will rise and the country's current accounts index will come closer to
balancing, despite the increased cost of imported oil.
To date there has been no indication that any country is prepared
to precipitate the round of competitive devaluations which would be the
inevitable consequence of a genuinely "dirty" float. 140 On the contrary,
there has been evidence that countries are currently quite self-conscious
about currency slides. 141 Indications are that they intend to intervene in
139.
140.
at 7. col.
141.
value for

J. REP., 1974, at 287.
See generally N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1974, at 53, col. 5; IMF SURVEY, Jan. 7, 1974,
1.
Witness the French in late January intervening to maintain a relatively high
its franc.

NAT' L.
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such a fashion as to maintain the integrity of the system, within bounds
which are somewhat 142 nebulous and subject to change without notice. 143
Thus, the danger of a "dirty" float and a rush of competitive devaluations still exists and the Committee of 20 is currently at work on guidelines which will determine the outer limits of permissible central bank
activity. 144
2.

THE QUESTION OF RESERVE

Gow

VALUATION

The second of the two outstanding pressures which has been exerted
upon the international monetary system by the effects of the oil shortage
is the pressure to officially recognize the private market valuation of
gold. If governments were to do so, they would automatically increase
the value of their reserves by a factor of four . 145 There is a certain charm
associated with this. Not only would it create vast new reserves by
simple fiat, but it would also parallel the fourfold increase in the price
of crude.
The United States is opposed to such action, favoring a diminished
role for gold in the monetary activity of the international community.1 46
Instead, the United States advocates an increased reliance upon Special
Drawing Rights (SDR's), or "paper gold," 147 to provide the increased
liquidity which will be needed to finance the purchase of oil in the
months to come.
The question before the international community, then, is whether
the system which has been fashioned over the past thirty years will rise
to the challenges occasioned by economic shortage, or if instead, it will
142. "Somewhat" is used here advisedly since past performance indicates that certain limits are significant for psychological reasons.
143. Rather than in depth consultation or even arm's length negotiation, the vogue
with respect to currency moves has been a diplomatic notification to friendly governments
just prior to public announcement.
144 . . . . or inactivity.
145. $42.22 x 4 = $168.88. The current price of gold in the world's bullion markets is
in the $160 to $165 range.
146. See note 139 supra. See also INT'L CURRENCY REv., Jan./Feb., 1974, at 43.
147. In recent months there has been considerable discussion aimed at the establishment of a new system of valuation for the SDR. The Ministers of the Committee of 20
decided at their January meeting in Rome on a solution to be applied at least for the
interim period. This solution will involve setting the SDR equal in value to a "basket" of
leading currencies. An SDR will have the same value, in terms of any currency, as would
a basket consisting of a certain number of U.S. cents, plus a certain number of German
pfennige, plus a: certain number of U.K. new pence, and so on. The result will be that, as
currencies float up and down against one another, the value of the SDR will remain in
the center; it will appreciate in terms of weak currencies that float down, and depreciate
against strong currencies that move up. By definition the SDR will remain constant in
terms of the whole group of currencies composing the basket. IMF SURVEY, Feb. 4, 1974,
at 40.
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prove more effective to rely upon the "barbarous relic" of gold which has
demonstrated undaunted tenacity as the medium of exchange par
excellence for the past 6,000 years.
OUTLOOK

To observe that the trading world is currently experiencing a period
of distinct shortage is perhaps to belabor the obvious. But to speak of
'" shortage" is to deal in abstraction; and as with all abstractions, shortage must be seen as a relative concept. Stripped of its emotional patina
shortage really designates a condition characterized by total supply
being insufficient to keep prices as low as they have traditionally been.
However, the classic resolution of the problem should be the higher
prices themselves. These should attract greater production initiatives,
hence greater supply and ultimately lower prices. As is often said, the
greatest cure for higher prices is higher prices. There is every reason to
believe that this scenario will be followed in an almost instinctive reaction to the profit motive. However, this reaction is not of the knee-jerk
variety. The realization of increased commodity supply requires a lead
time measured not in months, but years.
Unlike a shortage in manufactured products, the shortage of primary goods is far less easily overcome. Most manufacturers have spare
industrial capacity; they normally utilize less than 100 percent of their
plant, and workers generally work less than full overtime. In times of
increased demand this reservoir can be tapped to increase supply. However, such elasticity exists to a far lesser extent in the production process
of primary goods. In the case of minerals and fossil fuels, mines and bore
holes must be sunk; in the case of food, current grain supplies must be
diverted from consumption to increased cattle feed and seed. This results in the greater supply of metals, petroleum, meat and grain but
requires time and contributes to still higher interim prices. Lastly, since
primary goods are by definition nearly impossible to dispense with,
bidding for the remaining stocks will likely result in price increases far
surpassing the actual shortage. In other words, a ten percent supply
shortfall will likely result in a twenty-five percent price increase before
a sufficient number of would-be buyers are finally shocked into withdrawing from the bidding war.
Thus, the outlook for the next several months is for continued commodity shortfall and higher prices-what has come to be known as economic dislocation. These will be reflected in the decisions of the business community, and as such, will continue to have a significant impact
upon international commerce and the raison d'etre of international commercial law.
Robert B. Huguet
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